1940. "Eyes of the World Turn to America's Election"

The Urgency of the 1940 Presidential Election

President Franklin Roosevelt in Kingston, New York on Election Day, November 5, 1940 (source)

From The New York Times, November 3, 1940:

EYES OF THE WORLD TURN TO AMERICA'S ELECTION

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Our Decisive Power in Both War and Peace Fully Recognized Abroad

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By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

Not since the wartime vote of 1916 has the choice of an American President interested the outside world so keenly as the present election. People everywhere, in the depths of Russia and China as well as in Britain and occupied Europe, will watch us anxiously as we cast our ballots next Tuesday. They will watch us because popular elections are becoming a rare sight on this planet. In most countries free choice is just a remembered luxury, like safety, coffee, planning ahead.

But the main reason for their intentness is selfish—the feeling that they, too, are involved in our choice. Sometimes vaguely, sometimes acutely, they feel that the man empowered to head this government for the next four years is destined to play a leading part in the widening drama of war and peace.

A Hope Disappointed

At home it was hoped that the candidates' agreement on such fundamentals as full aid to Britain, conscription, armament, to the limit of our speed and capacity, would expunge foreign policy from the political debate. Inevitably, however, the argument has tended to focus more and more on this issue. The earth revolves in a red fog of war, and as the campaign developed nothing could prevent the war from dominating all other questions in the mind of the American people.

The President recognized this when he changed his plan and went out to explain his attitude to the country. In the early days of his administration, scenes from his first campaign were thrown on a screen one evening in the upper hall of the White House. "How I miss the crowds!" was his comment as he looked. He is an extremely perceptive and observant man, and as he resumed the role of campaigner, in touch with the crowds, it is noteworthy that he laid increasing stress on his determination to keep the country out of the war.

Mr. Willkie also met the American crowd. In a few places they greeted him with eggs and "boos." Most of the time he was received with enthusiasm, louder, it seemed, as his own voice grew hoarser.

Thoughtful Americans

But what struck him in all the crowds was their seriousness. Hostile or friendly, the people were thoughtful and deeply in earnest, he told a friend after a cross-country tour. He, too, sensed the reason for this anxiety; his later speeches were almost entirely devoted to questions rising out of the war and the defense program.

The people, in short, raised the question the candidates at first wished to ignore. As the race neared the end, with Mr. Willkie demanding greater help to Britain and Mr. Roosevelt dispatching ships and planes and promising more, the main issues had narrowed down to two: Which contender will arm us fastest? Which is more likely to keep us out of the conflict?

Abroad, likewise, these questions overshadow more immediate concerns. For the past week or two, despite the thrust into Greece, the major struggle seems to have been held in suspense, almost as if the war were waiting for the result of the election. In the heat of the electoral battle it was charged that the British hope for the re-election of Mr. Roosevelt and the Axis Powers favor Mr. Willkie. If this is true, in each case the preference is based on the fact that both the Germans and the British know the President. Mr. Willkie is an unknown quantity; while he has given every assurance that his foreign policy will be identical with Mr. Roosevelt's, the Germans may figure that any change would be for the better and the British are quite satisfied with things as they are.

True or not, the preference does not affect many voters in this country. As between the two sides of the war, the American preference is solidly and almost unanimously "set." Few oppose helping the British or blocking the Axis. As between the two candidates, however, Americans were never so bent on deciding for themselves, according to their own conception of the national interests.

The injection of this red-herring issue is nevertheless significant. It proves that next Tuesday's balloting is an international event of far-reaching importance. The choice of Mr. Willkie may be taken in Germany as a sign of American unwillingness to enter the war. The choice of Mr. Roosevelt may be interpreted in England as an augury of more active participation. Europe inclines to echo our most contradictory campaign arguments—that the President will move more rapidly toward intervention than his opponent and that the Republican candidate will put more speed into the building of a war machine.

Fear of America Itself

The inner recesses of governmental minds are not likely to harbor these contradictions. If Hitler and Mussolini discussed this election at Florence, doubtless they agreed that we are already virtually in the war. Publicly they might cheer the defeat of Mr. Roosevelt; privately what they fear is America itself, the incalculable power of the people in a democracy. They are under no illusion that American policy in a crisis can be decided by any will but the will of the people.

The British know this even more certainly. Mr. Churchill is on close terms with the President and would regret to see him leave office. But the relations between the White House and Downing Street were just as intimate when Mr. Chamberlain was Prime Minister. Methods, persons, emphasis and conditions alter, but representative governments do not reverse their policies overnight, as dictators can. In the present case, moreover, a change of administration does not mean a change of policy, and this implies far more than a unity of view on the part of the candidates; it is striking proof of popular agreement on our primary interests.

Why, then, if the election supposes no drastic shift in policy, is it watched with such interest from Singapore to Narvik?

The answer lies in the nature of the world struggle now in process. It lies in the preponderant weight America throws into the balance as other powers are absorbed drained or by war. This conflict has a tidal quality; it ebbs and flows, roars and subsides. The spurts and lulls indicate that it is only partly military. From the beginning armies, navies and air fleets have merely supported other means of pressure. Between battles, behind the war front, all the manoeuvres have but one object—to anticipate and determine the shape of the peace.

Where Great Battles Lie

In this contest, in fact, military operations constitute only one phase. The great engagements are political, diplomatic and psychological. This is why the leader we select is of such importance in the international view.

People in Europe who are still able to think ahead look more and more to the White House as a lighthouse in the universal blackout. It is about the only normal seat of government to which they can look as a point of reference. This is true of the subjugated peoples and also of the British; engrossed wholly just now in the struggle to survive, they turn to us not for material support only but for visible reassurance that the life they are defending is still going on. Be sure, moreover, that the Germans and Italians regard this Federal union as the supreme standard of comparison, the challenging alternative to Hitler's "new order."

Even last Spring, before the Continent was "occupied," unofficial Europe was thinking of the United States as a factor in the war and as the arbiter of the peace that would eventually follow. Repeatedly, especially from government heads in small capitals, now no more, the writer heard remarks like these:

"The next Administration in your country will represent the new balance of power in the world." "In the next four years you will decide the fate of your country and ours." "The next President will have to be a greater statesman than your last Messiah, Wilson, presumed to be; he will have to make terms with a revolution."

With the world background in mind supporters of Mr. Roosevelt argue approximately thus: "The President is a great figure. He has played a conspicuous role in a world drama that has already destroyed most of the performers. His relations with foreign powers have been closer and more constant than those of any of his predecessors. This experience is invaluable; in foreign affairs he has knowledge, a sure touch, a horse trader's shrewdness, a useful confidence in the ability of this country to hold its own against any combination of brains or power. Above all he has imagination, a sense of American destiny as well as his own. He has been working for a long time on plans for peace, for a new order to oppose to Hitler's. If he ever fulfills his ambition to be a peacemaker, he will produce a blueprint that would inspire the world and reduce the Nazi organization to something like a prison code."

The Counter-Arguments

On the other hand, the arguments for Mr. Willkie might be these:

"Internationally, Mr. Willkie starts from scratch. If he lacks the advantages and renown of the President's experience he also lacks the disadvantages. Mr. Roosevelt has aroused great confidence abroad and sharpened deep antagonisms. The bitterness and disappointment of defeated peoples like the French are sometimes transferred to him. Some blame him for his part in Munich, others because his words encouraged the democracies to rely on American support we were not prepared to give. His name is associated, one way or another, with the tragic controversies that divide nations within themselves. Mr. Willkie has uncommon sense, the drive and energy needed to speed up our defenses, a fervent and contagious faith in the genius of this country and the benefit of being a new man with a fresh approach to problems the old hands have failed to solve."

Europe hangs on our choice—because Europe hangs on America. To the watching world, dictators and democrats, it is America and American power that count. The President may give a direction and emphasis to this power, but he cannot control it, and Hitler knows this as well as Churchill does.

As for Americans, they know that both candidates put American interests first. They are aware that this country will influence outside events in the degree in which it is strong, united, wise and faithful to itself. The President who will best mobilize that strength and express that unity and faith will be the best minister of our foreign policy and therefore the best hope of the world.

1941. President Roosevelt Sounds the Alarm on Hitler

Roosevelt Declares a State of Unlimited National Emergency

From LIFE magazine, June 9, 1941, pp. 31-32:

ROOSEVELT ON AMERICAS

HE SAYS HITLER THREAT IS REAL

On the day after President Roosevelt's historic East Room broadcast of May 27, a U. S. shortwave listening post heard the BBC in London re-broadcast a recorded excerpt from his speech. Back across 3,000 miles of ocean came the serene voice, the measured diction in which an estimated 85,000,000 people around the world had listened to the night before. It was followed immediately by another voice, shrill, frenzied, guttural, rising and falling in geysers of ungrammatical German as Adolf Hitler addressed a recent Nazi meeting. Then came a third voice, that of the British announcer, saying: "We leave it to you listeners to judge which voice is the voice of calm and strength and which is that of hysterical violence."

As Alf Landon and Wendell Willkie can testify, the quality of a man's voice and speech has much to do with his ability to sway mass emotions. In this respect, President Roosevelt has entered his battle with Adolf Hitler possessed of a mighty weapon. But without ammunition, the biggest of guns is worth nothing. More than voices and perhaps even more than arms, it is ideas which will decide the Roosevelt-Hitler duel.

This week LIFE is able to present in dramatic juxtaposition the ideas with which the President and the Führer are contesting for the minds and hearts of the world, and especially for those of the American people. The immediate issue between them is whether, in the present crisis, Americans shall act with whole-souled vigor and conviction or whether they shall continue to be plagued by what Hitler has named as his weapons: "mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness, panic." Four days before President Roosevelt sounded his stirring call to action from the East Room, LIFE's special correspondent in Europe, ex-Ambassador John Cudahy, went to Berchtesgaden for an exclusive interview. There Hitler presented to him boldly and baldly the ideas with which he hopes to divide, lull and scare the American people into inaction.

As published here, the Hitler interview documents the passage in the President's speech in which he declared: "There is, of course, a small group of sincere patriotic men and women whose real passion for peace has shut their eyes to the ugly realities of international banditry and to the need to resist it at all costs. I am sure they are embarrassed by the sinister support they are receiving from the enemies of democracy in our midst—the Bundists, the Fascists and the Communists. . . . It is no mere coincidence that all the arguments put forward by these enemies of democracy . . . are but echoes of the words that have been poured out from the Axis bureaus of propaganda. Those same words have been used before in other countries—to scare them, to divide them, to soften them up. Invariably, those same words have formed the advance guard of physical attack."

PRESIDENT COMMITS U. S. TO FAR-RANGING ACTION IN NATIONAL EMERGENCY

A dozen photographers' floodlights beating down on him from every side of the East Room blinded the President to everything but his microphone-littered desk as he entered the East Room and sat down. After they dimmed, he could see, on the east wall, the portrait of George Washington which Dolly Madison carried away when she fled from the British advancing to burn the White House in 1812. He could also see the pretty faces of two Latin American diplomatic ladies, Señoritas Maria Elena Dávila and Erma Castillo Nájera, niece and daughter of the Mexican ambassador, in the front row of his little audience. The ladies and their escorts were there for a reason. The President had summoned the representatives of the 20 other American republics and of Canada to be present because his speech was to be a supreme warning and appeal for unity to the whole Hemisphere.

Sitting among the diplomats in a blue-gray tulle dress, Mrs. Roosevelt was having some solemn thoughts which she duly reported in her column. "I looked at the President," she wrote. "Like an oncoming wave, the thought rolled over me: 'What a weight of responsibility this one man at the desk, facing the rest of the people, has to carry. Not just for this Hemisphere alone, but for the world as a whole! Great Britain can be gallant beyond belief, but in the end, the decisive factor in this whole business may perhaps be the solidarity of the Hemisphere and, of necessity, the President of the United States must give that solidarity its leadership!'"

For a half hour before broadcast time the President, fortified with cigarettes and ice water and completely at ease, sat at his desk cheerfully submitting to photographers' demands that he look up, look down, smile, read, look solemn. Then, after the guests had filed briefly by for a handshake, came time to speak. In the back row Playwright Robert Sherwood, who with Justice Sam Rosenman had collaborated in writing the speech, nudged Songwriter Irving Berlin each time the President drove home a strong point with a life of his voice and a beat of his clenched left fist. These points:

On Hitler: He definitely intends to conquer the Western Hemisphere.

On defense: To forestall attack, the U. S. must and will take military action without further notice to prevent Germany from acquiring bases in Greenland, Iceland, Dakar, the Azores and Cape Verde Islands.

On freedom of the seas: The U. S. insists on it. All measures necessary to insure delivery of U. S. goods to Britain will be taken.

On duty: All citizens are expected to take loyal part in the common defense from this moment forward.

On arms production: The U. S. Government will use all its powers to see that neither capital nor labor interferes with it.

On war aims: "We will not accept a Hitler-dominated world. And we will not accept a world, like the post-war world of the Nineteen Twenties, in which the seeds of Hitlerism can again be planted and allowed to grow. We will accept only a world consecrated to freedom."

The President ended by announcing that he had proclaimed a state of unlimited national emergency.

It was a strong and stirring speech. But many a listener who clicked off his radio with conviction that the nation was now on a virtual war basis and that action would follow swiftly was bewildered by events of the next few days. No defense strikes were ended. Wheeler, Lindbergh & Co. talked on unhindered. (Said Lindbergh: "If we say our frontier lies on the Rhine, they [the Germans] can say theirs lies on the Mississippi"—which by a strange coincidence was the same geographical figure Hitler employed in his interview with Mr. Cudahy.) The President roused vast excitement by calling a special press conference, only to send reporters away scratching their heads over the purely negative news that he did not intend to order convoys, that despite his insistence on freedom of the seas he did not intend to ask repeal of the Neutrality Act, that his emergency proclamation meant nothing until he implemented it with specific executive orders.

The fact remained, nonetheless, that the President had publicly committed the nation to a fateful course of action, had made plain what he intends to do. How he intends to do it is, as he several times informed the press conference questioners, what Adolf Hitler would like very much to know.

1961. Interview with Secretary of State Dean Rusk

Secretary Rusk Discusses Foreign Policy

This interview with Secretary of State Dean Rusk aired on the CBS program "At the Source" on June 29, 1961. The text (including the footnotes) is adapted from a transcript printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1149, pp. 145-151 on July 24, 1961, and has been altered slightly to reflect the audio:

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "At the Source" Program

Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk on a Columbia Broadcasting System TV program, "At the Source," on June 29.

ANNOUNCER: It is at this desk that some of the major decisions of our time are made. The CBS Television Network takes you to the office of the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C. We are "At the Source"—the physical setting in which Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, thinks and works and acts on important questions of foreign policy.

In an informal and spontaneous discussion recorded earlier today, Secretary Rusk meets with chief CBS News Washington correspondent Howard K. Smith and CBS News correspondents Bill Downs and Paul Niven. Now let us join their discussion "At the Source." Here is Howard K. Smith.

SMITH: Mr. Secretary, you've had a long and varied experience as a subordinate in the State Department, and now that you have had 5 months as the head of the State Department, have you learned anything you didn't know then?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, when I was one of 10 Assistant Secretaries back 10 years ago, I thought then that life was fairly complicated and busy. It's no less so today. I think the thing that I did not appreciate 10 years ago is that the Secretary almost never has the fun of dealing with a simple question; those are handled by his colleagues down the line. Most of the questions which come to the Secretary's desk and go from there to the President these days, given the pace and complexity of our relations with the rest of the world, are, shall I say, most interesting and usually complicated and difficult.

DOWNS: Well, Mr. Secretary, we who wander around this big building, which is your headquarters here, have sort of a saying that if you are pessimistic 100 percent of the time, why, 99 percent of the time you're right. But there must be another side of the coin. Hasn't something ridiculous happened to you since you've been in—something funny?

SECRETARY RUSK: Oh, I think there are a number of amusing things which happen along the way. It might be a little embarrassing to spell them out here, but there are always unearned dividends in this job—some perfectly ridiculous event occurring somewhere that no one could have predicted, with not grave consequences, but which adds to the gaiety and enlightenment of the world scene. No, there is fun in this job, too.

West's Commitment in Berlin

NIVEN: I suppose the least funny aspect of life today for you is Berlin, Mr. Secretary. It's now 2½ years since Khrushchev said he was going to sign a peace treaty with East Germany. Have our contingency planners in that time made a tentative decision as to where we draw the line? Do we let him sign his peace treaty with East Germany and wait for the East Germans to stop our trucks, or do we resist the peace treaty itself?

SECRETARY RUSK: Mr. Niven, the President yesterday in his press conference made a very important statement on this question,¹ and I don't suppose it would be well for high officials to make fresh statements on almost a daily basis on such a serious question.

But let me say this in direct answer to your particular question: The essence of our commitment there—of our rights—and the basis for our concern about the future in West Berlin is the right of the three powers—the United States, United Kingdom, and France—in West Berlin—our obligations and responsibilities to the people in West Berlin, and the commitment of the West to the security and freedom of West Berlin. Now there are a great many questions which have been discussed and talked about—formulae, proposals, counterproposals—but this is the essence of the matter: We are there by right, not by sufferance. We have obligations to ourselves and to the people of West Berlin, and we do not accept the notion that those rights can be terminated or that the security of the people of that city can be endangered by the unilateral action taken by someone else.

SMITH: Mr. Secretary, a thing that bothers me—and I think bothers a great many people—is the thought that we may be prepared to be firm against an all-out, all-at-once warlike threat in Berlin. But the possibility exists that the Russians won't give us such a challenge. Instead they will try to shave away our rights in installments so small that none will seem worth fighting about.

Are we prepared to face the possibility that they will attempt first to grant East German puppet police the right to police our traffic, then delay the traffic, then harass the traffic? Are we prepared to meet that threat?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, this is one of the problems which will have to be thought about, considered, planned for in our discussions within our own Government and with other governments. In a situation of this sort the Soviets would probably try to create an ambiguous situation because these are more difficult to handle and deal with and to explain publicly.

DOWNS: What do you mean, sir?

SECRETARY RUSK: Along the lines of Mr. Smith's comments, that is, to leave it uncertain, to let whatever action occurs occur with hesitancy or with concealment or with indirectness, because the underlying issues are simple and direct and these must be understood by our own people and by peoples in other countries and it is important to keep the ambiguities cleared away so that we know exactly what the issues are.

DOWNS: Well, if we agree that freedom is not negotiable in Berlin, what is?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, since 1946 the Western Powers have made a series of proposals for a permanent settlement in Germany and in Berlin. Now these have taken a variety of forms over the years. Most of them have had to do with the self-determination of the peoples concerned.

This is an instinctive American reaction to the way in which you go about settling questions of this sort—ask the people themselves what solution they themselves want. And in the long turn of history this also may be the wise course in looking for a permanent solution because history is full of situations where the absence of self-determination has led to ambitions, appetites, revanchist ideas which in turn disturb the peace.

NIVEN: Do you expect this crisis to unfold according to any kind of a timetable, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY RUSK: The timetable, of course, depends upon all parties here. Mr. Khrushchev has indicated that he expects to take certain action by the end of the year. That does not mean that he might not raise one or another part of this question before then. That also does not mean that everyone else would wait until the end of the year to address themselves to it. So I think that it is safe at this time to say, Mr. Niven, that the Berlin question is going to be with us as an active question on our agenda both before the Government and the American people for the next several months anyhow.

Discussions Among Governments

NIVEN: Is there a hint there that we may try to beat him at his own game by proposing negotiations?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, I think there is no question that there will be discussions among governments about Berlin, including discussions with the Soviet Union. In the first instance, for example, we will be replying to Mr. Khrushchev's aide mémoire² on the subject. When you raise the question of negotiation, this to some people implies a particular form or forum or way of talking. What I am saying is that undoubtedly this question is going to be discussed—but under what circumstances and in what way it will be reached—in the course of discussions among governments now going on.

SMITH: Mr. Secretary, Winston Churchill once said that, if the Allies had made it perfectly clear to the Germans before either world war that they would fight and just where they would draw the line, there wouldn't have been either world war. Would it not, in view of that, be an act of wisdom to let the Russians know exactly what we would not permit—for example, if we would not permit their East German police to take over the stamping of our traffic papers into and out of Berlin?

SECRETARY RUSK: The issue mentioned by Mr. Churchill is a central one in relations between a dictatorship, or an authoritarian form of government, and the democracies, because it is relatively easy for a highly centralized regime to underestimate the political processes which go on in a democratic society.

We debate vigorously among ourselves; we differ with each other. We have all sorts of internal quarrels as we sort out our political arrangements on a democratic basis, and, indeed, in our discussions with our friends abroad there is considerable public discussion of different points of view on important questions among thriving democracies.

Now, there is a temptation on the part of an authoritarian ruler to think that this is a sign of weakness and lack of unity. Indeed, a miscalculation on this point, an estimate that democracies would not do what in fact they would do, is a source of danger. So there will be a number of points of clarification of purpose and procedure and issue, aimed at the avoidance of this kind of miscalculation.

SMITH: These will be made public, will they?

SECRETARY RUSK: Public, and I presume in the course of intergovernmental discussions, yes.

Question of German Reunification

DOWNS: Well, Mr. Secretary, Walter Lippmann this morning said that it is the unstated policy of Britain and France to preserve the division of Germany as it now is. We, at the same time, are calling for reunification of Germany. Is that not a dangerous division of policy or opinion on the part—between us and our allies?

SECRETARY RUSK: The Western proposals on Germany and Berlin over the years have been on the basis of agreement. And the record there is filled with proposals to give the Germans a chance to decide on such questions as unification.

Now, when a new approach or a new move is made, such as was made in the Russian aide mémoire that was delivered to us at Vienna, you can expect all the governments directly involved to review the entire history of the situation, consult with each other, and decide how to move from here.

I myself am confident that there will be unity and agreement among the governments directly concerned and that disunity is not going to be the problem.

DOWNS: Someone said that the art of diplomacy is to avoid dead ends. Do you think that both sides have avoided a dead end at this stage of the game in Berlin?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, I think it is important not to come to the dead end but to explore every possibility of working out a tolerable peace that is consistent with the vital interests of our own country.

NIVEN: Some people have interpreted Mr. Khrushchev's speech yesterday as an indication that he is in a diplomatic hole that he got himself into and that he is almost appealing for help from the West in getting out of it—that this was a much more moderate speech than some of its predecessors. Do you agree, sir?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, appraising a particular speech is sometimes a little hazardous. Of course we read a speech of that sort with considerable care and interest, but in view of the record of the last several weeks I think one would not wish to leap to conclusions too quickly on the basis of a single speech. After all, those of us who have to make speeches from time to time know how easy it is to say things a little differently and without necessarily implying too much by it. But this will be given very careful study, of course.

Nuclear Testing and Disarmament

SMITH: Mr. Secretary, Berlin is topic A in the world. Can we talk to you about topic B—nuclear testing and disarmament?

Have you any theories as to why the Russians, who seemed to be interested in reaching a treaty to ban nuclear tests with us for several years, suddenly this year seem to have lost interest in it?

SECRETARY RUSK: There may be several reasons which move them in that direction.

I think Mr. Khrushchev, in his aide mémoire on the subject,³ and in some of the things that have been said in speeches and other places, made it quite clear as to what one of the reasons is. They have made, it seems to me, a far-reaching and fundamental decision about their attitude toward international organizations and international arrangements on such things as inspection and control. Their experiences in the Congo and their estimate of the effect of the actions taken by the United Nations in the Congo upon their policies in that country led them to say that "we are not going to subject the interests of the Soviet Union to decisions made by somebody else." 

Now, this is essentially the origin of the so-called "troika" formula—that in these matters there will be a Communist, a capitalist, a neutral, and that each one of them would have a veto on action taken.

Well, now, obviously, this would lead—if this is the principle on which the inspection machinery is organized and operated—obviously this would lead to self-inspection or to an ability to bar effective inspection and control and that would be unacceptable for the rest. I think it's also important to bear in mind that for the Soviet Union secrecy is a very great strategic advantage, as they see it. Their communications on the subject of disarmament, nuclear test control, suggest that they look upon international inspection and control as a form of espionage that effective control discloses secrets within the Soviet Union.

Well, this is for them a serious step. But for the rest of us it is a vital step, because we find it difficult to see how you can proceed down the path toward disarmament unless you have reasonable assurances that none of us will be, as Aristide Briand once put it, dupes or victims in this business.

So we have been discouraged, although not surprised. We have been discouraged by the attitude of the Soviet Government in the recent nuclear test discussions in Geneva. We had hoped that we could get that agreement, not because this represents a major step in disarmament but because it was a most significant first step and it would have established the principle of inspection and control and given us some experience in the actual operation of a system of inspection and control. This would then open the way for further steps in the disarmament that we all would like to accomplish, if we can find a way to do it consistent with our security.

Question of Resuming Testing

DOWNS: Well, Mr. Secretary, right now there are calls on Capitol Hill and elsewhere in the Government to resume testing. From the diplomatic viewpoint, do you think after a 3-year moratorium that the damage it would do to our prestige and power among the neutrals, whom we have been trying to woo the most, is worth the military gains that we would get out of resuming testing?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, this is a very serious question which must, of course, preoccupy the mind of President Kennedy. And he commented on it yesterday.⁴

I think that when we balance up these matters we will find that, in the first place, the world does understand that there is on the table at Geneva a reasonable, workable treaty⁵ submitted with bona fides looking toward the suspension of tests and the establishment of a genuine test-ban system. Now, I don't think we should assume that, because people in other parts of the world as well as our own people would hope that progress can be made on these matters, that they would not fail to understand that the rest of the world has a vital interest in the steps that the United States may have to take in the protection of its own elementary security.

NIVEN: Mr. Secretary—

SECRETARY RUSK: So this is a matter for the future and has to be; this is something that the President will have to decide in the weeks and months ahead.

NIVEN: Mr. Walter Lippmann has raised the possibility that Mr. Khrushchev may want tests resumed because Russian scientists need them more than we do at this point. Is there any feeling in our Government that that may be true?

SECRETARY RUSK: That is the kind of question which will have to be examined, but I think that it would not be useful for me to comment upon where the advantages might lie in the circumstances. This is something that has to be judged on a highly technical basis involving many classified elements, and I think any observation on my part would be beside the point.

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

SMITH: Can we turn to Latin America? I would like to ask you what exactly is our policy towards Cuba?

One of your spokesmen has said, ". . . Communism in this hemisphere is not negotiable." Then, what do we do about Castro?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, there are two main things that it seems to me must be done and which are in process.

One is that we must do everything that we can to insure that Cuba is not, itself, exploited as a base for the further penetration of forces and elements from outside the hemisphere into other countries of this hemisphere; that is, any attempt to use Cuba as a base for agents or arms or whatever it is into other countries will require the immediate and energetic attention of all the governments and countries concerned.

I think, secondly, that the members of the Organization of American States do more than ever now recognize that this is something more than a bilateral question between Cuba and the United States, that it is in fact a problem for the hemisphere, that it is a potential disturbance to the peace of the hemisphere, and that the OAS, itself, should give it very serious thought and attention. We are developing our diplomacy and our discussions with other governments along both these lines.

Sino-Soviet Penetration

SMITH: Well, this penetration is, however, going on, is it not? I understand that the other day—one day this week in Montevideo—five tons of Mao Tse-tung's writings on guerrilla warfare were confiscated, and it's thought that they came via Cuban channels to Montevideo.

SECRETARY RUSK: I think we must recognize in this country that the Sino-Soviet bloc has made a very serious decision that it will try to press its opportunities beyond our alliances—jumping over the alliances, going around the alliances—in order to make as much headway as possible in the so-called underdeveloped parts of the world.

Mr. Khrushchev has indicated that—his great interest into these parts of the world include Latin America—in the underdeveloped countries; since 1954 they have been putting more and more resources into economic and cultural relations, and they have been building up their propaganda very rapidly.

Now, we believe that they will make an effort, a serious effort, in Latin America with all the propaganda and other resources at their disposal. We feel that the primary protection against this kind of attempted penetration is the mobilization of the energies and interests and the loyalties of the people of Latin America in their own economic and social development, because, if the peoples of this hemisphere show that they are on the move, along the lines of President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress,⁶ if they are ready themselves to take their own futures in their own hands and can move to build up their own education, their health, their productivity, that this is the way that societies become impervious to this sort of penetration. Now there are other things in the propaganda field, in the cultural relations, in broadcasting, many things which we can do more strongly than we are now doing. These require funds, and funds are not always easy to come by.

DOWNS: Well, Mr. Secretary, without getting into sort of washing dirty linen on the CIA and the rest of it, have you found that the Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in the Cuban fiasco gave us a black eye pretty well all over the world? Have you found that it dictates policy any place else other than it did in Cuba?

SECRETARY RUSK: I don't think that I want to comment about a specific agency and a specific episode. I am reminded of a statement made earlier that as far as that particular event was concerned, there was something in it for everybody. (Laughter.)

But, no, I think that policy of the present administration in our foreign policy is made by the President and the Secretary of State and his key advisers.

DOWNS: Well, let me ask you another one, and let me quote you—I've got it written down here, "Rusk's law."

There has been some discussion about whether or not there are two State Departments, one in the White House and one over here in this building and in your office, and you wrote back in Foreign Affairs a year ago, "No department or agency can be coordinated by a parallel department or agency." In other words, if you have got two agencies working on the same problem, you never get together. Do you think that's happening?

SECRETARY RUSK: Oh, I'm sorry that I have to suggest that is a misquotation. That was a law to which I was objecting in this article. That is, I do not myself take the view that it should be considered infra dig to defer to a companion agency.

Now, that coordination is something which ought to be worked out by the assignment of central responsibilities to identifiable individuals and departments who, in turn, have the responsibility for coordination with their neighbors. And we do need to work toward a simplification of the arrangements by which we come to our decisions, and I think the present administration has been doing that.

Handling of Latin American Affairs

DOWNS: Then you find no objection to the Presidential task force under Adolf Berle, or any conflict with the new Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Woodward?

SECRETARY RUSK: When the new administration took responsibility on January 20, there were a great many urgent jobs that had to be done quickly. For example, the book which my colleagues in the Department kindly prepared for me, entitled "Major Issues Facing the New Administration," was a looseleaf book some 3 inches thick. Now, there were several things in the Latin American field which needed to be done promptly. For example, the program under the so-called Bogotá program had to be presented to Congress, and quickly, to get the program moving. This could not have been done in the time available through the normal machinery of government; so that task force took that on. The Brazilian financing was a part of it. Some of the steps we have taken in Bolivia was a part of it. So that task force, during this period of getting started, has done some extraordinarily helpful and effective things.

Now, as we settle in and we get our new arrangements set, the normal procedures will more and more, of course, take over.

NIVEN: But I think you might agree, sir, that Secretary Dulles was perpetually vigilant to see that there was no great influence on President Eisenhower in the foreign policy field from anybody except him, whether it be from Dr. Milton Eisenhower or Harold Stassen or anyone. Is this something every Secretary has to watch out for?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, how these procedures work is, of course, a matter of interest to any Secretary and to any President. But let me just comment that Washington, to me, is a city which is filled with quiet diplomacy but a good deal of local gossip.

Actually, the President is in full charge of his office and of foreign policy, and he has used the Department of State and the other departments as he needs them to help him in this job. There is close and friendly contact between his personal staff and the departments concerned.

After all, with the abolition of the old Operations Coordinating Board, it would be expected that certain members of his personal staff and the staff of the National Security Council would be more active in the liaison field than before. But let me assure you that this is not a matter which has struck into the actual operations of government in the way that some of the reports would suggest.

SMITH: Mr. Rusk, are you in favor of Secretaries of State traveling a great deal? (Laughter.) I understand you have traveled more than Mr. Dulles in an equal period of time.

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, there were three slated meetings of foreign secretaries that were facing me when I first took office, and I felt that I ought to go to those meetings and get acquainted with my colleagues from other countries. Then there was one unplanned meeting at Geneva over Laos.

I still think that the principal post, the habitual post, of the Secretary of State ought to be at his desk in Washington. I have discussed with some of my colleagues among the foreign ministers the problem of organizing a sort of trade union of foreign ministers to create tolerable working conditions for ourselves.

SMITH: Excuse me, sir. I'm afraid that's all the time we have.

On that thought, I would like to thank you very much, indeed. We all have a national, nonpartisan interest in wishing you the very best of luck.

SECRETARY RUSK: Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.

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¹ For text, see BULLETIN of July 17, 1961, p. 107.

² An aide mémoire was handed to President Kennedy by Premier Khrushchev during their meeting at Vienna June 2-4.

³ For texts of a Soviet aide mémoire of June 4 and a U.S. note of June 17 in reply, see BULLETIN of July 3, 1961, p. 18.

⁴ Ibid., July 17, 1961, p. 106.

⁵ For text, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. 870.

⁶ For texts of an address and a message to Congress by President Kennedy, see ibid., Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

1930. The German Fascist Movement Draws Alarm

The Ascendant Nazi Party Lays Out Its Ominous Platform

A 1930 election poster of the German Centre Party (Zentrum) "depicts the Zentrum party as a bridge, leading its followers across the political abyss under the banner of Catholicism. Down in the chasm, 'chaos, terror, and turmoil,' personified by the followers of the extreme left and right-wing parties (who are identified by the red flag and the swastika respectively), try to forge ahead" (Illustration by Theo Matejko – source)

During the German federal election in September 1930, The New York Times wrote about the political platform of the ascendant far-right National Socialist Party in Germany under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, the "German Mussolini." The party explicitly laid out its plans for Germany, heavily incorporating antisemitism, xenophobia, and racism. The Nazi Party ultimately received over six million votes, causing alarm both in Germany and across the world.

From The New York Times, September 15, 1930:

FASCISTS GLORIFY PAN-GERMAN IDEAL

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Stand for Ultra-Nationalism, Restrictions on Foreigners and Anti-Semitism

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OFFER ECONOMIC PANACEAS

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Hitler, Party Founder, "Man Without a Country," Came Back After Year in Jail for Coup in 1923

The National Socialist Party, or the German Fascist party, represents the extreme Pan-German ideal of a purely German State. Its platform includes demands for the immediate unification of Germany and Austria, annulment of the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, equality in military force with every other country in Europe, the restoration of Germany's colonies, the nationalization of all trusts, the participation of workers in the profits of manufacturing, discontinuance of reparation payments, the socialization of industry and a nation-wide campaign to disfranchise or drive from Germany all the Jews.

Other planks in the party's platform, drawn up by its founder, Adolf Hitler, known as the German Mussolini, are the following:

The land shall be nationalized without compensation and exploited for the common good.

The death penalty shall be applied to usurers and persons who have made large profits out of their fellow men.

All non-Germans shall be expelled from Germany as long as unemployment exists and while it is impossible properly to nourish all German citizens.

No further immigration of non-Germans shall be permitted and all non-Germans who have entered Germany since Aug. 2, 1914 shall be immediately expelled.

The first duty of every citizen is to be physically and mentally at work; those who do not work shall not eat.

Unearned income is to be abolished.

All department stores shall be confiscated by the State, divided into small shops and rented at normal prices to small shopkeepers.

The State shall purchase its supplies mainly from small shopkeepers.

The Reichswehr shall be dissolved and a large national army established.

All journalists must be German citizens, and all productions of art and literature contrary to the principles of true Germanism are to be suppressed.

Program Widely Distributed

This program was distributed by the millions throughout Germany during the present campaign.

Herr Hitler, a one-time architectural draftsman, is, ironically enough, a man without a country. Born in Braunau on the Inn, in upper Austria, on April 20, 1889, he lost his Austrian citizenship when he volunteered in the German army at the outbreak of the war. He failed to apply for German citizenship when he was still a political non-entity, and since he has become the avowed enemy of the present republican form of government his applications for citizenship have been constantly rejected.

On Nov. 8, 1923, Herr Hitler, along with General von Ludendorff, staged the notorious Bavarian "Putsch" [coup] to overthrow the government, declaring himself dictator of Germany. The revolt was quelled the following day and next April Herr Hitler was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. He spent a year in prison, during which time his party deserted him. No longer considered a menace the Government took pity on him and released him.

As the Fascist party in Italy is the creation of Benito Mussolini, so is the Fascist party in Germany the creation of Adolf Hitler. His chief power lies in his oratory and he is ranked in this respect with Alexander Kerensky, Leon Trotsky, Aristide Briand and Signor Mussolini. So dangerous was his oratory considered by the authorities that for four years he was forbidden by every State in Germany, with the exception of Thuringia and Mecklenburg, to speak in public. The ban was first lifted by Bavaria in 1927, but Prussia did not lift it until this year.

Herr Hitler's sonorous, penetrating tenor, combined with his histrionic ability, makes him especially effective with audiences of young men and young women, the backbone of his party. He is also regarded as a remarkable organizer.

A Remarkable Come-Back

Herr Hitler's come-back after the total collapse of his "Putsch" is considered one of the most remarkable in modern European politics. For a time after the collapse he had hardly a friend left. During his year in prison his party united, against his express command, with the German People's Freedom party. One month after his release he had won enough disciples to found his present party and, in the Reichstag elections of May, 1928, he polled a vote of 809,541, gaining twelve mandates to Parliament.

In their method and organization the German Fascists very closely resemble the Communists. One of the most effective instruments organized by Herr Hitler is the "storm squads," duplicates of the Communist "red front squads." These "storm squads" are thoroughly trained with weapons and are excellently equipped for street fighting with the Communists. The two parties have been held responsible for 90 per cent of the political killings and street brawls that have made German post-war elections the most violent in any European country.